Reducing Collective Action Problems among Larger-Scale Societies: Building Trust, Assurance, and Cooperation at Late Postclassic Tlaxcallan, Mexico

Summary

This is an abstract from the "Advances in Puebla/Tlaxcala Archaeology" session, at the 88th annual meeting of the Society for American Archaeology.

Collective action problems arise when individuals expend energy or resources to obtain a common goal or outcome. However, conflicting interests hinder cooperation and preclude joint action. Visibility and trust are two factors that reduce collective action problems among small and mid-sized groups, but research is limited on how these variables affect cooperation in larger-scale societies. Trust is often reduced in larger organizations because all participants do not interact on a face-to-face basis. Developments in game theory and collective action research have demonstrated that interaction among participants at smaller scales can build trust and offer assurance that most participants will not “free-ride,” thereby facilitating cooperation. We explore this theory at a large scale, using a case study from Tlaxcallan, Mexico. Ethnohistoric accounts suggest the multiethnic confederacy was comprised of multiple competing sociopolitical interests, yet cooperation was achieved in resisting Aztec conquest and constructing council-based governance. Cooperative institutions are revealed by “egalitarian” iconography visible on public architecture. Similar iconography found on Codex-Style Polychromes recovered from households is examined to determine if participants in different barrios consumed this ideology. While not all households participated, efforts to build visibility and trust and reduce competitive tensions among a multiethnic population are indicated.

This Resource is Part of the Following Collections

• Advances in Puebla/Tlaxcala Archaeology   •
• Society for American Archaeology 88th Annual Meeting, Portland, OR (2023)

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Record Identifiers

Abstract Id(s): 36937.0